One aspect of the game that defeats beginners and intermediate players is the concept that every card means something. Take this deal from the second semifinal session of the Kaplan Blue Ribbon Pairs from Seattle last year, and focus just on East's cards and the North's hand (dummy).

North-South were playing Precision, which resulted in an inelegant sequence to one no-trump rather than two diamonds. But it was up to East-West to punish them.

Using fourth-highest leads, West started with the club four: jack, queen, six. The club two went to the nine and 10, and the club three was returned to East’s king. When West let the club eight hold the trick, East had to decide how to continue. Dummy had pitched a heart and two diamonds on the clubs; declarer had thrown a heart.

Should East play a spade, in case declarer started with the doubleton spade ace and five solid diamonds? Or should he play a diamond, in case declarer had the spade king and not the diamond king?

The answer came from West’s decision to win the second club trick with the 10, not the ace. (He knows East has the club king from the play to the first two tricks, so he has a choice of plays from equals.) When he then returns the club three, not the ace or five, he has played his lowest card at each turn, signaling for a diamond through.

The general rule about signaling is that you encourage to get a suit continued, and discourage to get the obvious shift. Occasionally, though, an unusual card should wake partner up to making a counterintuitive play.

In today’s deal from the Seattle Board-a-Match, Sid Brownstein, South, bravely balanced into his opponents’ suit, and his partner took him seriously. Against three spades doubled, the low heart lead went to the king and East’s ace, and East cashed the diamond ace, West signaling with a middle diamond. East now played back the heart jack, on which Brownstein carefully discarded his diamond king, eliminating the threat of the diamond ruff. When declarer subsequently located the club queen, he was able to wrap up 730.

In my opinion, both defenders were responsible for the poor result. East really should have shifted to a low spade at trick three — what high card other than the spade king could his partner hold that would set the contract and without that card how could West have doubled three spades? Equally, West might well have dropped the diamond jack on his partner’s play of the ace. This would have been an “oddball” signal to wake up partner to the need to play the unusual suit to get his ruff — in this case, a trump!

Here, by contrast, the diamond queen would simply show the queen and jack and suggest to East that he could continue the suit if he wanted to, or was able to.

In today's deal from the Seattle Nationals last year, South reached three no-trump after his vulnerable opponents had done a lot of bidding. So it was fair to assume suits wouldn't split.

The heart queen held the trick on opening lead. A second heart to the ace was followed by a third heart, on which declarer had to discard from dummy. Name your poison!

South erred in practice — and maybe in theory as well — by pitching a spade. He then crossed to the club king to play a diamond to his ace (hoping East had a doubleton queen or jack, in which case the suit might be set up without letting West on lead) as his best chance to bring in the diamonds.

The 4-1 break in diamonds — disappointing but hardly surprising — brought South up short. East discarded a spade, and the best declarer could do was finesse in spades against East and hope for the clubs to break. Hardly surprising that that chance failed, but declarer had already given up his best play for the ninth trick.

Had he pitched a club from dummy at trick three, play would have continued precisely as before. But after a spade to the jack holds, declarer cashes his spade king and plays three rounds of clubs. Because the spade A-10 remains in dummy, declarer would have been able to endplay East in clubs to lead a spade into dummy’s A-10 at the end for his ninth trick.

Many people find percentages at bridge dull. They may have a point, but today we are going to look a little closer at the old adage "Eight ever, nine never."

When you are missing four cards in a suit, you should normally play for the drop of the queen, but when missing five cards in a suit, you normally finesse for a key card rather than play for the drop.

However, note that use of the word “normally.” It is particularly true that when you are missing four cards, the slightest indication that one opponent has greater length in that suit than his partner — as few as a two-card differential — should sway you to play the defender who is short in that suit for the queen.

Let’s look at the first of this week’s deals from the Seattle Nationals last year. West’s jump to four clubs showed that suit and spades (so-called Leaping Michaels).

I suppose I’m getting old, but East and especially South seem to be well short of their bids. On lead against six clubs, West was hoping he had two tricks and that his partner might come through with a little something, given his vulnerable weak two-bid … not tonight, Josephine!

On a heart lead, declarer won and cashed the club ace, but then should he finesse or drop? This one is easy. Since East has six hearts and West two, West has much more room in his hand for the trump queen than East, so the finesse is a heavy favorite to win.

At a recent Nationals, this deal was the last of a four-board extra-time segment. It determined the match, and yes, while four spades might have been easier, let's assume that East would have sacrificed in five clubs had he been offered the chance. Plan the play in five diamonds after a top club lead.

Declarer ruffed the club lead and could see that there was no realistic danger to cope with except 4-0 trumps. He led the diamond king from dummy at trick two and was more hurt than surprised by the trump break. What would you expect to happen next?

He led a second diamond and ducked East’s jack. When the defense found the most challenging continuation of a second club, South found the only route home by following with his remaining club and pitching a heart from dummy!

Now, when a third club was led, he could ruff in hand, then cross to dummy, and draw trumps with the aid of the diamond finesse. He scored a club ruff, four trumps and six major-suit winners. This is the first time I’ve seen that particular maneuver exercised with such expert trump control. Normally, one takes the ruff in the short trump hand, not the long one.

Notice that if declarer ruffs the second club, he can no longer draw trumps. Since he cannot cross back to hand in spades, the defenders will score both a heart trick and a second trump trick for down one.

Today's deal comes from an international report. Against three spades Geir Brekka began with his singleton club jack, ducked all around.

Now West was uncomfortably positioned. A spade continuation would allow declarer to fulfill his contract, since inevitably a few tricks later West would find himself endplayed, obliged to play a heart or diamond, allowing declarer access to dummy to pitch his club losers.

A diamond continuation was also unattractive. So West decided to switch to a small heart. Dummy played low, East played his heart two, showing an odd number of cards, and declarer won the trick with his king and led his singleton diamond.

By now Brekka already knew declarer’s shape: six spades, two hearts, one diamond and four clubs. So he took his diamond ace, played his heart ace, and carefully continued with his spade 10 (NOT the five). Declarer won the trick with his jack and cashed the spade ace.

Brekka had realized that if he now followed with his small spade, at the next trick he was going to be endplayed by declarer with his spade king. He would then have to play a heart or a diamond, providing a much needed entry to dummy, letting declarer pitch all his club losers. Brekka therefore dropped his trump king under the ace, trading one trick for three and defeating the contract.

John Armstrong, aged 56, died of a brain hemorrhage just days after returning from representing England in the 2008 European Championships. With his partner John Holland, John finished in second place in the Butler rankings (for average IMPs won) — quite an achievement for a pair from a team that finished in 12th place.

Armstrong was on the team that won the Silver Medal in the 1987 Bermuda Bowl World Championships — Britain’s best performance since taking Gold in 1955. And he was also on the teams that produced Britain’s most recent best Open results in European Championships — runner-up in 1987 and winner in 1991. (The British Open Team’s previous win was back in 1963.) Today’s hand is from that 1991 victory.

Armstrong, the declarer in three no-trump, could see eight tricks — he must come to at least two in hearts — but where to go for the ninth? Britain was on Vugraph at the time and the commentators made an assortment of erudite suggestions. But John’s solution was simple: he won the club lead and continued with ace and another spade. East won with the king and returned a club. John now ran the heart jack, which East could not afford to win. When the heart jack held, declarer played a third spade. West took the queen, but with the heart ace still in dummy, John could not be denied access to his established spade jack. Contract made.

Compare what happened in this deal from the first round of last year's Vanderbilt tournament, when a top-seeded team met a less highly ranked squad.

At the first table, where the expert was declarer, the heart jack lead went to declarer’s king. East held up the club ace twice, West discarding a small diamond. Now, instead of playing a third club and giving East the chance to shift to spades, declarer cashed his red-suit winners and took his nine tricks.

In the other room South also opened two no-trump and was raised to three no-trump. West led the heart jack to declarer’s ace, and declarer then played the club king, West playing the five. How did the expert East defend?

East could see that he would never beat this contract unless his partner had good spades. Since one of the red queens in dummy was sure to be an entry to the clubs, the holdup in clubs was never going to be that effective.

Accordingly, East decided to break the rules and win the first club (in case it was declarer’s ninth trick, as could easily have been the case if declarer had five diamonds). Now he switched to spades, and — more importantly — he covered the possibility that his partner had the ace and jack of spades by shifting to the spade queen.

Declarer was helpless now; whatever he did, the defenders had four spade winners.

When this deal occurred in a team game, at the first of the two tables West made his natural lead of the club king against three no trump. Declarer allowed this to hold the trick, as he did the club queen continuation.

South won the third club perforce, and counting eight tricks, chose to combine his chances in the red suits to seek the ninth. He cashed the heart king, then the ace, but no queen appeared. His last chance was the diamond finesse, but when that also failed, so did the contract.

At the second table, and against the same lead, South won the second club and was pleased to see that East followed. Declarer then led three rounds of spades, and this time was happy to see West discarding on the third round. He was about to cash dummy’s last spade when he paused to do a little arithmetic.

He intended to throw West in with a club, thereby effecting an endplay in the red suits. But for this he needed two discards for the clubs, so he had to retain the heart K-J-5 and the diamond A-Q in hand. Therefore he could not cash the fourth spade until West had taken his club tricks.

So declarer left the spade winner in dummy and played a club at once. West took his tricks as South pitched one card from each red suit, but then had to concede the balance.