At last year’s Yeh Bros. tournament, both North-South pairs bid to four spades here, and they could have doubled their opponents if they had dared to bid on.

In one room, West sacrificed in five hearts doubled; the defenders took their club ruff, then played a top spade. What would you do now? If you tested trumps before ruffing a diamond in dummy, you weren’t quite careful enough. That was what our West did. North was able to pitch spades on the third and fourth diamonds, so though declarer could ruff his diamond loser and unblock the heart ace, he was locked in dummy and had to concede a trump promotion against himself for minus 800. (You have to play three rounds of diamonds without touching trump at all in order to escape for two down.)

In four spades doubled in the other room, the defenders led two rounds of hearts, and South ruffed. Like his teammate, he innocently played a top trump, which should have proved fatal.

He next crossed to dummy in clubs to lead the spade jack — ducked by East, of course — then ran the diamond six around to the queen and ace. West could force declarer in hearts once more, but when East took his diamond king, he did not have a fourth heart left to tap declarer for the last and critical time. So the contract came home. East would have had to fly up with the diamond king on the lead of dummy’s six, to continue with hearts. That would have let his partner play the fatal fourth round of hearts when in with the diamond ace.

Today’s deal was a missed opportunity in the match between Zimmerman and the Netherlands: If the Netherlands had made their game here, they would have won their match instead of missing out on a chance of winning a large prize purse.

For Zimmerman, Lauria-Versace had played in three no-trump rather than four spades. After a club lead, declarer naturally finessed in spades and was down at once.

In the room shown, Simon De Wijs played four spades after a blind auction where his partner’s initial response to his strong club opener had shown a balanced positive. After a trump lead, De Wijs finessed, and Geir Helgemo won to return a club, reasonably enough. What should De Wijs do now?

Declarer led a trump to dummy and a heart to the nine and jack. (Yes, maybe leading the heart 10 from dummy wouldn’t hurt — even against a player of Helgemo’s class.) Back came a club; now De Wijs simply played for hearts to break and went down.

A slight improvement at trick three might have been to lead a high trump from hand, or after playing a trump to dummy, to ruff a club back to hand. When East discards, West is more likely to have begun with honor-doubleton in hearts than with two small, since in that case he likely would have led a heart, not a spade, to trick one.

That being so, the right play is to lead a low heart to the eight at trick four or trick five, as appropriate. As the cards lie, you will now have three heart tricks and your contract.

At the Yeh Bros. tournament last summer, the New Zealand team did not have much to cheer about. But GeO Tislevoll (formerly of Norway, but now a New Zealand resident) found a nice line in the game here.

As South, declaring four hearts after a straightforward, if optimistic, unopposed Drury sequence, he received a club lead. He won the ace and took a spade finesse, then played the ace and another spade, ruffing with the seven. Then he played the club king and ruffed a club, and led his winning spade 10. When East followed small, Tislevoll carefully ruffed it with the jack as West pitched a diamond. That allowed declarer to ruff his last club in dummy and lead dummy’s heart queen.

East had to win his ace, of course, and he was then able to cash the diamond ace, felling his partner’s king for the defenders’ second trick. East could give his partner a diamond ruff now, but GeO’s trump ten-ace of the king-eight was good enough to take the last two tricks when West had to lead away from his 10.

Did you note the defensive resource? When declarer ruffs his winning spade to hand at trick seven, West must underruff, preserving his diamond holding.

The key difference here is that when declarer leads his trump from dummy, East can win the heart ace and underlead his diamond ace. Now the defenders cash two diamonds, ending in East, after which the defense can promote a trump for West on the lead of either plain card in the two-card ending.

Today’s deal from the Yeh Bros. tournament last year is out of character for this column: While the play is easy, the bidding is unusual. But the auction shows how good players think, even in a relatively unfamiliar partnership.

When the Poles were eliminated from the main event, they swapped partnerships for the consolation event. Michal Klukowski and Piotr-Pavel Zakorski won it, having found their way to a grand slam with the splendid auction shown here.

The one-club opener didn’t promise a good hand, but it could have had short clubs. After North’s natural and non-forcing two-club response, Klukowski (South) set clubs as trump with his rebid, then bypassed his heart ace to cue-bid his spade ace, knowing that if North did anything but bid five clubs, he would have a heart control. Then Klukowski would bid the grand slam.

When North denied a heart control, Klukowski’s five-heart call showed the ace and promised interest in a grand slam. That would let his partner bid the grand slam, sign off with no extras, bid five spades with second-round control (which would be bad news) or do anything else appropriate. North’s five no-trump call was intended — and interpreted — as extra club length or an extra diamond control.

Klukowski now knew his partner had at least two spades and two hearts, so relatively short diamonds were guaranteed. If his partner had seven clubs, he would be almost able to claim the grand slam; as the cards lay, there were indeed 13 top tricks.

Today’s deal comes from the Swiss Qualifier at the Yeh Bros. tournament in China last year. The tournament is the biggest cash prize event on the regular calendar; it consists of a Swiss qualifying tournament followed by a knockout.

Today’s deal presents a defensive problem. Put yourself in the West seat and see what you would do. You start by leading the heart 10 against three no-trump; partner’s seven is discouraging as declarer wins the queen. South now plays a diamond to the ace, and partner’s diamond four is part of a style where echoing in diamonds would have been a further discouragement in hearts.

Declarer now passes the spade jack to you, partner’s four suggesting an even number. Can you think of a good reason not to win this — and what will you do next?

At the table, West took his queen and decided the play so far was consistent with declarer holding A-Q-J of hearts. So, he decided to go for the gold with a shift to the club king. I’m not sure what he intended to do if declarer had ducked — as he surely would have if this shift had been the best defense. But as you can see, this line of defense did not test declarer.

In the other room, Ivan Nanev for Bulgaria, sitting East, did not give his partner, Julian Stefanov, that problem. He followed with the heart jack to his partner’s lead of the 10 at trick one. There were no further complications in the defense now. When you think about it, how can that be wrong?

In today’s deal from the Yeh Bros. tournament last July, one South opened and rebid clubs, and played in two clubs. The other followed the sequence shown; readers can decide whose method of handling the South cards they prefer. But certainly, reaching four hearts while concealing the major elements of the strong hand has something to recommend it.

For Chinese Taipei, Sidney Yang led a top club, and David Yang (East) won the first heart to play back a club. Declarer Keyzad Anklesaria put in the 10, forcing the jack, and ruffed in dummy, then led a spade to the king and ace, and ruffed the next spade high. Now he lead a heart to the nine and got the good and bad news.

Next he played a low diamond from dummy; had East ducked, declarer would have put in the jack and led clubs to neutralize West’s trump holding, with a diamond re-entry to hand if West ruffed the first club. East actually took his diamond ace and played back a second diamond, but declarer could simply win in hand and run clubs through West for the trump coup.

Nicely played by declarer, but where the New Zealand team was defending four hearts on a similar auction, also on a top club lead, Matthew Brown as East won the heart king at trick two and shifted to a low diamond. To make four hearts now, declarer would have had to put in the jack — a tough but not impossible play. When he played low, he found himself stuck in dummy and could do nothing but led a spade to West’s ace, after which a diamond return for the ruff settled declarer’s hash.

Different partnerships play inverted raises (a system in which the direct raise of a minor in an uncompetitive auction is strong, while a jump raise is weak) in different ways.

South had agreed that the simple raise was forcing as far as three of a minor. Thus, his two-no-trump call was forcing, suggesting 12-14 or 18-plus. When he bid on over three no-trump, he showed the extra values, and North had such weak trumps that he had no reason to choose to play in the suit contract, especially because South could have moved on with a call of four clubs over three no-trump if he had wanted to set clubs as trump. That was a good idea today!

West put the spade jack on the table, and declarer won in hand and led a heart to dummy to advance a low club from that side. When East showed out, declarer saw that his only chance now would be to strip West of all his plain cards and force him to lead clubs at trick 12.

So he cashed his three remaining heart winners, West pitching his fifth club, after which three rounds of diamonds forced a spade out of West. South had a complete count of the West hand now, but when he took his last spade winner, he was locked in dummy, forced to lead a club and concede two of the last three tricks.

Too late, South realized that to make his slam he had needed to win trick one in dummy. Then, in the same three-card ending, he would have been able to lead a low club from hand, and West would have been forced to concede the last two tricks.

When East upgraded his 14-count into a strong no-trump, South came in to show the majors. He ended up in two spades when North wisely opted to find his partner’s better major and not to invite game. That was sensible enough, since these deals are so much more often about contesting the part-score than about reaching game in the teeth of a strong opening bid.

When West led a diamond against two spades, South flew up with the ace and ruffed a diamond to hand with a high trump (necessary as the cards lay, to preserve a possible entry to dummy) before leading a heart toward the queen. West took his king and shifted to a low club to the jack and ace. Now came a second heart to the nine and 10. Seeing dummy’s weak trump holding, East won and continued with the ace and another heart. That let West score his spade nine, but declarer was able to discard a club from dummy and eventually ruff a club loser on the board for his contract.

It would not have done East any good to continue clubs when in with the second heart, assuming declarer guessed correctly which club to play from hand (not so easy to do).

In fact, though, the only way to beat the game by force is to lead a trump to the first trick. This is often sensible when declarer has shown a two-suiter and you either have a strength in declarer’s second suit or can infer that your partner does, as is the case when he has opened one no-trump.

No one could be more enthusiastic than I about the merits of reading bridge hands in books and especially newspapers (a fact that may not entirely surprise you). However, when you do so, you will often be consciously or subconsciously aware that there is a critical play or kill-point in the deal. At the table, of course, the players may not hear the bell ring to tell them to focus their attention. By the time the bell does ring, it may be for their own funeral.

Consider the contract of four spades here. When West leads the heart king, East gives count by starting an echo, so West continues by leading out his high hearts. Would this seem like a critical moment in the deal to you? It should, since if declarer ruffs the third heart with dummy’s solitary trump, East will over-ruff, and a diamond return means that declarer cannot escape a diamond loser.

As declarer can afford to lose three tricks, it is sensible to retain dummy’s lone trump as an entry to the South hand to allow him to draw trumps. The discard of a minor-suit card from dummy at trick three solves the problem. A further heart lead by West can be ruffed in hand. Trumps will be drawn, and South’s losing diamond vanishes on a club.

Similarly, of course, the defenders cannot profit by shifting to a minor at trick four. After winning the trick in dummy, declarer can draw trumps, following which, once again, the losing diamond can be disposed of on a club.