The most challenging defense of the week from the US women’s trials in 1997 came Lisa Berkowitz’s way; put yourself in the East seat and see what you think.

As East you are defending to four spades after North has opened a multi two diamonds to show a weak two in hearts or spades, and South has jumped directly to four spades, to play. Partner leads the diamond king, and when you play the diamond queen, shifts to the diamond five. Your jack holds as declarer follows with the four and 10; over to you.

I do not know how to resolve the problem here. But it seems as if partner has led their middle from their remaining three small diamonds, in a position where the size of their card could be argued to be Suit Preference. Given that they had a choice of small cards, logic implies that her leading her highest of the small diamonds would ask for a heart ruff, and the low card would have called for a club.

Assuming partner might have shifted to a singleton heart at trick two, there is at least a case for the winning defense, of shifting to a trump. Berkowitz did this, and not surprisingly generated a game swing as a result, since in the other room West had led a top diamond and shifted to a heart at trick two, trying to cut dummy off from the hearts. As you can see, this was very much the wrong moment for that play.

20 years after losing the semifinals of the 1996 US trials, some deals still haunt me. This is one of them, where in the last set of the semi-finals, one of the early boards saw my partner Bob Hamman having to figure out how to beat a slam on opening lead.

Normally it is a good idea to pre-empt to the limit, but on this occasion that strategy did not pay dividends. In the other room, my team-mate as south heard West jump to three hearts, over which North’s bid of four hearts was not an unequivocal slam try, but rather simply a suggestion of at least the values to expect to make four spades. South had some extras, but decided to settle for four spades. This did not seem such a bad idea when the defense started with three rounds of clubs, holding declarer to 10 tricks.

However, at the table where my partner was West, he logically enough imagined that declarer had hearts under control. He also expected dummy to produce a side source of tricks, which meant it might be critical to set up his own side’s source of tricks. Since I could have held a longer minor with a four-card major, Hamman chose to lead a diamond.

As you can see, that cleared up the guess declarer would otherwise have had on a major suit lead as to how to play diamonds for his contract. This cost us 11 IMPs where we might have gained 11, and was the first in a series of results that cost us the match.

In the first set of the semi-finals of the US women’s trials of 1997, the squad captained by Sue Picus eliminated most of their carry-forward deficit, thanks to a neat defense by Lisa Berkowitz and Marinesa Letitzia.

Juanita Chamber’s decision to pass four hearts was not an obvious one, but Kathie Wei-Sender found herself in a perfectly playable spot. Letizia led the diamond ace, on which her partner’s diamond four suggested a club shift. The club 10 was taken by dummy’s ace, as Berkowitz followed with the seven, presumably denying the eight.

Now declarer ran the heart jack, ducked to East’s queen. If Letitzia had returned the club nine, the eight in declarer’s hand would have become established. Equally, a diamond would furnish a ruff and discard, which did not seem to accomplish anything for the defense.

However, Letitzia switched to a spade, forcing declarer to commit herself at once. Wei-Sender finessed successfully and tried a second heart, but Berkowitz took her heart ace, and returned a second spade. Declarer was now isolated from her spade suit, and the best she could do was to try to drop the club queen. When that failed, she was down one.

Since in the other room Mildred Breed was declarer in an unbeatable four spades, which could not be defeated, that was a big swing to the Picus team. They ended up comfortable winners of the match, and went on to win the trials, then captured the Venice Cup in Tunisia.

Today’s deal looks too easy to be worthy of being a problem in this column. You play four spades after your partner has produced a second negative then suggested only tepid support for either major, persuading you that slam cannot be a favorite to make.

You receive the lead of the club jack, overtaken by East’s queen. When the club ace comes next, you ruff, and should pause before making your next play. The danger is that trumps are 4-1. If they are, then you will run out of trumps before you can establish your 10th trick from the hearts. The secret is to find the play that works when spades are no worse than 4-1 and hearts no worse than 4-2.

The solution is both charming and unusual. Declarer must attack both major suits in idiosyncratic fashion — by leading the jack or the 10 before any of the aces and kings. Suppose you lead the spade jack to trick three. West does best to win and force declarer with another club, ruffed in hand.

Now declarer plays the heart jack, to leave the defenders without recourse. The point is that the next round of clubs can be ruffed in dummy, and declarer can come to hand with a diamond to draw trump

If declarer plays either the spade or heart ace prematurely he fails. Either the defenders can set up a force (if you go after trumps) or take a heart ruff, if you let East in on the second or third round of hearts while West still has a trump left.

Arnold Palmer, who died last year, was a keen bridge player. His go-for-broke style was applied not only on the golf-course, but also in business, and equally, he also tended to go all out at the bridge table.

Here, when Palmer’s partner jumped to four hearts, he used Blackwood, then went all the way to seven no-trump. In that contract either a diamond or heart finesse would be necessary, but the heart finesse on its own would not suffice. However, after the seven no-trump call, West had hitched, which helped Palmer decide to play him for the missing high-cards. So rather than take the diamond finesse – in abstract the best chance — Palmer played to squeeze West.

After a club lead, he took the clubs and the diamond ace then ran the spades. On the last spade, West was toast. If he discarded a heart, Palmer would pitch the diamond from dummy and run the hearts with the aid of the finesse. If West discarded the diamond king, Palmer could let go a heart from dummy and finesse in hearts.

One of my readers, Peter Peng, a golfer and bridge player who has returned to the game after a 20-year layoff, had Palmer autograph the bridge book by my old boss Ira Corn, in which this play was first described. Corn, you will recall was responsible for assembling the Aces bridge team. At the end of 2016 the St. Petersburg Bridge Club auctioned the book, with the proceeds going to a children’s home.

On today’s hand, North had enough values together with a source of tricks to assume slam must have decent play. With a balanced hand, there didn’t seem a particularly easy way to offer a choice of slams, so he simply bid six no-trump. However, one possibility might have been to transfer to diamonds then jump to five no-trump, offering a choice of slams.

You could forgive West for feeling that the chance of a diamond lead costing a trick was negligible. You can tell the fates are aligned against you when you are dealt a four-card sequence and find when you lead it that it costs you a trick – in a vulnerable slam to boot!

The lead certainly simplified declarer’s task; when he put up the ace, the bad break came to light. His projected 13 tricks had turned into 11, but South began by running the clubs. West had to find three discards, and two of them were easy when he let go hearts. Then he bared the spade jack, but two rounds of spades put him back under the gun.

Both West and dummy had reduced to two hearts and four diamonds. On the last spade winner West let go a heart, as did dummy. Declarer led a diamond to the eight and king, crossed to hand with the heart ace and led another diamond. West had to split his honors, and declarer ducked the nine, leaving West to lead away from the 10-6 of diamonds into dummy’s Q-7. Contract made!

When South opens a strong no-trump, North has enough to raise to game. His strong six-card suit makes this worth much more than a typical nine-count.

From a bare suit headed by the J-10 it would be reasonable for West to lead a low spade, but the presence of the nine make the lead of the honor correct here.

South should win in hand (preserving a possible re-entry to the diamonds) and should lead the diamond jack, on which East has a problem. But when dummy comes down, East should be immediately aware that there is no apparent entry to dummy outside the diamond suit. Do not waste your time while declarer plans the play; think now!

East should be able to work out that if South has only two diamonds, he can prevent the diamond suit coming into play, by DUCKING the first diamond. South will probably repeat the diamond finesse, and you can spoil his day by winning your carefully concealed diamond king.

Be careful! The hand is not over yet. If you make the mistake of playing back a heart now, declarer can recover by running your lead to his 10, and all of a sudden dummy comes back to life. Instead, shift to the club eight, (showing no interest in the suit) and when your partner wins the trick he should revert to spades, leading back the spade 10. Even if declarer works out to duck your partner’s 10, you still beat the contract by winning the next spade and reverting to clubs.

Most of us are familiar with the idea that unnecessary jumps in an uncontested auction can be used for splinter bids. The definition of a splinter – devised by Dave Cliff and Dorothy Hayden Truscott in the 1960’s – is a forcing raise for partner’s suit, showing a singleton or void in the named suit.

The logic of the application of a splinter extends to the contested auction. On the sequence presented in today’s auction, where South was playing four-card majors, West promised both minors, and the jump to four clubs was a splinter raise, showing game-going values, with short clubs. It also set up a forcing pass if the opponents had bid on.

After West’s revealing lead of the spade two against four hearts, South saw that he surely had two losers in that suit. To set up an endplay, South won his ace, took the club ace and ruffed a club, crossed to hand with a top trump to ruff a club, then drew the last trump and led a diamond toward the king.

Whether West flew up with the ace or ducked, declarer could no longer be defeated. Say West ducks; declarer wins the king and plays a second diamond. East can win, but if he does he will be endplayed to broach spades, and that will still be 10 tricks for declarer. If West instead wins the second diamond and cashes the third, then he will have to give a ruff-sluff, and one of the spade losers goes away.

Some people play that South’s response of two no-trump would be invitational, so that with no major and 13 to 15 points, plus balanced distribution and stoppers in the unbid suits, he must bid three no-trump. Others play that two no-trump would be a minimum game force and a jump to three no-trump would be a strong no-trump.

All roads lead to the no-trump game, though, and after West leads the spade nine, South can see that he needs to set up clubs to make his contract. This will be easy enough if East has the heart ace. But South must try to develop a club trick without relying on a favorable lie of the cards, if he can.

Specifically, while trying to set up clubs, South must keep East out of the lead. If he does not do so, and lets East in, that player would be delighted to shift to a top heart and set up four tricks for the defenders in that suit.

South wins the spade lead in hand and goes after clubs. When West plays low, South puts up the king, comes to hand with a spade and leads another club. When West follows with the queen, South lets him win the trick. The clubs are now established, and South will be able to unblock the suit, and cross to hand to run the clubs.

If declarer had played clubs from the top, West could unblock his queen at his first opportunity. Now East would come on lead with the club jack, and sink the contract with a heart shift.