One of the hidden sequences to which experts attach a meaning different from the casual player, is the jump overcall. The majority of experts temper discretion with valor, and especially when vulnerable may play a jump overcall to be closer to intermediate than weak. And almost without exception, experts play jump overcalls in the balancing or protective seat as intermediate, not weak. With a bad hand they pass, with a moderate hand they make a simple overcall.

In today’s deal South followed a simple route with his hand in the balancing seat. North had just enough to raise to game, and when dummy came down South saw that the hands fitted very well, and game would be straightforward if he could avoid a trump loser. It was worth making the effort to protect against a 4-1 trump break, so that was what South directed his energies to.

The defenders led the spade king, then shifted to the club queen. South won and played a second spade to West, and back came the club 10 to the king. Declarer played a heart to the king, then took a spade ruff, just in case. Now the heart ace disclosed the bad break, but South took the diamond king, and led a diamond to the ace. A second club ruff then reduced South to two trumps. In the three-card ending he exited with a diamond and claimed the last two tricks, since whichever defender took the trick would have to lead round to his trump tenace.

The most difficult hands to lead from are those where the opponents have a blind auction to a no-trump contract, leaving you three or four possible suits to choose from. Without an attractive or safe sequence, I’ll attack from a five-card suit, and often look to go passive rather than lead from four to an honor, especially four to an ace. Where faced with an equal choice of a major or a minor, you might prefer to lead a major if the opponents have not explored for a major-suit fit.

In today’s deal both Souths elected to open one no-trump, treating their hand as balanced rather than making a light reverse into hearts. Whether you agree or not (I’m not sure I do) in one room against three no-trump West was a believer in leading majors against no-trump. South won in hand and cashed his nine red winners, to make ten tricks. In the other room West led the club six, taken by East with the ace. When declarer followed with the club king, the layout of the suit was known. East cashed the club queen and West dropped the jack, then followed with the nine under the 10 strongly suggesting a spade shift. East now played the spade seven through, covered with the jack and queen. West won and put East back on play by leading the club two to the four for a second spade through. The defense took five clubs and four spades – a six trick difference from the other room!

In today’s deal you have to defend against a slam. It is sometimes easier to play against opponents you trust, as opposed to those whose bidding or play might be more eccentric.

The auction has been natural enough, the five diamond response to the straight Blackwood ace-asking bid shows one of the four aces. First you must consider your opening lead. With a likely trump trick, the singleton lead is both dangerous and pointless. You are much more likely to cost your side a diamond trick than to get a ruff, so you lead the heart king. This produces the heart ace, the three from partner, and the nine from declarer. Declarer now runs the spade queen, (partner producing the two and declarer the four). You decide to win the trick, and the ball is now in your court.

There is a real danger that partner’s club ace or your heart winner (if you have one) might vanish on dummy’s diamonds, unless you cash it right now. A diamond loser will never go away. So the question is whether declarer is off an ace, or whether he has a slow heart loser. The only clue that you have is that declarer’s jump to six spades over the Blackwood response without checking for kings might suggest he is missing an ace. Additionally, partner’s small heart at the first trick shows an odd number. Against a slam or five-level contract one should signal count on the lead of a king. Could declarer really have three small hearts and have enough to use Blackwood?

I say no, a small additional clue perhaps being that partner’s spade two at his first opportunity is suit-preference for clubs (if he has more than one trump!). All of those three things point in the same direction, of trying to cash a club. Note partner’s play of the heart three at trick one. All you asked for was the count, and despite his beefy hearts, he followed orders.

This is the last board this week from a past Yeh Bros Cup event. Reaching slam is not so hard; making it is another matter, but here are the lines chosen by a couple of successful declarers.

Bauke Muller of the Netherlands played six spades on the lead of the club four (third from an even number, low from an odd number). He won and drew trump, ending in hand, then took a diamond finesse. When the defenders continued the attack on clubs, West let go the club two – confirming an original four-card suit. Now declarer played three rounds of hearts, ruffing the third, then ruffed a club. In the three-card ending he knew East had begun with precisely three spades, two hearts and four clubs so it was marked to finesse against the diamond 10. Had West tried to conceal the club distribution, the count might have been far harder to confirm.

Paul Hackett of England also played slam here, from the North seat, on a trump lead. He won in hand and went to the club ace to take a losing diamond finesse. Back came a trump (yes, a club makes declarer’s task harder) so Hackett won and played three rounds of hearts ruffing in dummy. Then he played the last trump and took the diamond jack, and led a diamond to the ace. Now the last trump executed a double squeeze: with East guarding diamonds and West guarding hearts, neither player could keep the clubs; so trick 13 was scored by the club eight.

At the Yeh Bros Cup the match between the Sweden and Italy teams produced a splendid example of card-reading plus playing for the best chance to make an unlikely game. Antonio Sementa was the declarer here in an extremely delicate minor-suit game.

Presumably Sementa’s double of the spade-showing one heart showed hearts and a minor. It seems best to play the double and cuebid here as each showing a specific minor along with the unbid major, in this case hearts. Giorgio Duboin drove to game when confident he was facing short spades, and Sementa had to play five diamonds on a spade lead.

He took an uncharacteristically long time to play to trick two, but came to the right conclusion that East’s decision to compete to three spades marked him with extra shape. Since Sementa needed trumps to split, it was right for declarer to play him to hold heart length, because if he had club length Sementa would be left with three fairly sure losers. By contrast, if East had short clubs, the club and heart finesses might both work.

Eventually, declarer led a trump to dummy to run the heart queen. Nystrom won and also took his time before playing ace and another diamond. Declarer won in hand, passed the club jack, covered all round, finessed in hearts, set up the hearts, ruffed a spade back to hand, and finally took the second club finesse for 11 tricks. This was a fine example of placing the cards where they needed to be, to find a route to success.

In this deal from the Yeh Bros Cup, on which North-South declared four hearts, the normal but unsuccessful line was to lead a heart to the jack then play heart ace and another heart, which failed today.

Agustin Madala played four hearts and received a diamond lead to the king, a spade shift to the ace, and a second diamond. He rose with the ace, pitched his diamond on the top spade, finessed the heart jack, then played a club to dummy. Next came a diamond ruff on which East discarded a club, a second top club, and the master spade to pitch his last club. Now came a second diamond ruff as East pitched his last spade.

Declarer could then safely exit with the heart jack, to endplay East in trumps, knowing that if East won and had a spade to lead he would be able to ruff low and not be over-ruffed.

East should have pitched a spade on the third diamond, retaining his losing club. Declarer would have led the fourth diamond from dummy on which a club discard or low ruff by East would be hopeless. But East might have given declarer a losing option by ruffing high.

Declarer has to overruff and then has to read whether to exit with a high or low trump, depending on whether East’s remaining heart honor is bare, or if the nine is falling. I think declarer should play West for the bare nine, assuming that West has not false-carded earlier in trumps.

Today’s deal from the Yeh Bros qualifying saw the meeting of two squads who were on the verge of qualifying, and a missed opportunity for one of them.

In one room Jack Zhao showed the minors as East and bought an exceptionally poor dummy in three clubs doubled. The defenders took pity on him and never played trumps at all, allowing a diamond ruff in dummy. Still, minus 300 was not a great position for East-West with four spades so awkward.

Zejun Zhuang received the lead of the diamond 10 and ducked it to East’s queen. Back came a club and he won in dummy, led a low trump to the queen and ace, and guessed well when he next led a heart to the nine and king. A second club came back, so he won in hand and played a third club, planning to pitch a diamond and cross-ruff.

Alas for declarer, when West could ruff in, declarer was left with an inevitable trump and diamond loser. At trick six, had declarer taken a second heart finesse, by running the eight, covered by West, he would have been much better placed. He next leads out the spade jack then 10, which West must duck or declarer can draw trump and cash the club winner then take a third heart finesse. When both trumps are ducked, declarer changes tack and plays the diamond ace, ruffs a heart to hand and leads the club queen to pitch dummy’s diamond, leaving West with just the master trump.

In the Yeh Bros Cup, this was the last board of a very close semi-final between the two undefeated teams.

Consider what you would expect to happen at a normal table. South will open one club, West will double, and East will happily respond one diamond. West now bids one spade, and there the matter rests; it will all be about overtricks. No need for drama.

Ah, but what if South opens a Precision one diamond ? Now after West’s double what do you do as East? You probably bid one heart now in fear and trembling; try and stop low now with the East-West cards. That was what happened to Joe Grue; he did bid one heart, and ended up in three hearts. Since he could never reach his hand to take a heart finesse the defenders scored their four plain tricks and could lead the 13th club to promote the heart nine.

In our featured room Meckstroth also opened one diamond and Bjorn Fallenius as West also doubled. Eric Rodwell passed as North, and Peter Fredin produced the sort of call that makes him such good reporting material. He passed one diamond doubled, gambling that Meckstroth would never sit for it even with moderate diamond length.

It worked like a charm. Meckstroth escaped from his best contract, and eventually declared two clubs, doubled and down 800. Even on best declarer play in one diamond Meckstroth would surely have gone down 200 – so Fredin’s pass was right in both theory and practice.

Since the Yeh Bros Invitation teams is about to start in Shanghai, this week’s deals all come from past Yeh Bros Cup events. This deal is simply an exercise in percentages. How should you play the diamond suit for one loser in that contract?

Both tables in the match I was watching bid to the diamond slam here, in one case after a strong club and contested auction, in the other on an uncontested sequence. What are the three sensible options here? The first, selected by both Souths, is to run the diamond queen, planning a second finesse if appropriate. This loses when West has both honors – and therefore pays off to an original East holding of: void, either of the two small singletons and the small doubleton. The second line is to cash the ace; this loses when East began with a void or all four cards, or K-J third.

Better than either of these two lines is to run the eight from your hand, planning to finesse against East for the king, should the eight lose to the jack. This line of play loses when East has jack-singleton, or to jack-doubleton (assuming that West ducks stoically from his doubleton king — don’t we all?) and you misguess, but does not lose out to either void. Accordingly this is the best line, and it works today.

If you have a 5-4 as opposed to the 6-3 fit, playing the ace no longer loses to a void in East, but psychologically running the eight is still the best play.