Today's auction saw North and South disagreeing on the meaning of a jump to game in a game-forcing auction. So before we go on to look at the specifics of the deal, let's outline the two positions.

One is that in forcing auctions, jumps to game show a good fit or good suits, denying controls in the unbid suit(s. The second position is that whenever you are in a game-forcing auction, a jump to game in an agreed suit is minimum or non-slammish. This can be abbreviated to PFA or the Principle of Fast Arrival.

The first style is harder to play but makes use of the jump in the auction to show something specific, not just a minimum hand — when partner might want to explore, but can no longer do so efficiently. Popular as the second style is, I would certainly not apply it to today’s auction, where South’s jump to game should have shown a semisolid suit. (With a solid suit facing a jump shift, South would surely not have stopped short of slam.)

In any event, against six hearts, West leads the spade nine. How would you plan the play? If trumps are 4-0, you have no chance. If trumps are 2-2, it is even money whether you play to the jack or the king, so focus on when trumps break 3-1. The only 3-1 break you can deal with is the singleton queen. So you should win the lead and play a trump to your king.

At the end of the 1999 Cavendish, David Berkowitz and Larry Cohen were in serious contention for major honors, along with Michel Abecassis and Jean-Christophe Quantin. This board decided the minor placings.

With eight top tricks in three no-trump, South, it seems, would be able to find a ninth trick somewhere, especially given that West’s natural lead is the spade 10 or a club.

When Cohen led the spade 10 to the jack and queen, ducked, Berkowitz did well to find the heart shift. Abecassis won and cashed three diamonds ending in dummy (West pitching a club, East a spade), leaving a diamond entry to dummy, then led the heart 10 to Berkowitz’s jack.

East exited with the club queen, covered by the king and ducked by Cohen, to keep declarer from being able to cash his nine winners. If Cohen wins and clears clubs, that is declarer’s ninth trick.

At this point Abecassis cashed his diamond winners in hand (Cohen throwing hearts) and led a club, but Cohen claimed the rest with three club winners. South needed instead to cash the spade ace, then lead his low diamond to dummy to achieve a four-card ending in which he has cut himself off from his fifth diamond, but gets back two tricks by squeezing West. If Cohen pitches a heart, dummy’s suit comes in, but if West instead discards a club, declarer exits with a club and collects two heart winners in the end on West’s forced play at trick 12.

On this deal from the 1999 Cavendish, Michael Seamon found an excellent line to bring home three no-trump. After an informative auction David Berkowitz led the heart eight, and Seamon thought for a long while, then put up dummy's 10 and ducked East's king.

Larry Cohen continued the attack on hearts, and Seamon won the trick, then advanced the diamond eight. When Berkowitz ducked, Seamon let it run and subsequently finessed again in diamonds to bring home nine tricks. Should Berkowitz have worked out to block the diamond suit by covering the diamond eight? If his partner had started with the singleton diamond nine, this would not have been a success. But I suppose declarer’s pause at trick one might have persuaded Berkowitz that this was precisely what declarer was planning to do — and if so, that should perhaps have directed him toward the correct defense.

By contrast, when Norberto Bocchi and Giorgio Duboin defended three no-trump, Bocchi led a club. Declarer had to duck this, and now East shifted to the heart jack. (Note that if East plays a low heart, declarer lets it run to dummy’s 10, but the shift to the jack effectively surrounds dummy’s holding.)

Declarer covered the heart jack with the queen, and next dislodged the club ace himself. Back came a second heart, then the diamond eight, covered by Bocchi, and now three no-trump had to go down.

One of the pairs fighting for the top honors at the 1998 Cavendish was Bart Bramley, playing with Sidney Lazard. Sidney is one of an elite group of players who represented the U.S. in world championship play in the 1950s. By my count we are now down to a handful of such players, including Ivar Stakgold and Billy Rosen. Bart is a representative of the next generation who has now started a partnership with another of my regular teammates, Lew Stansby.

Bart drew an interesting inference to bring home this delicate four-diamond contract.

On the spade-king lead and continuation, Bramley put up the spade jack to force the queen and to confirm the location of the spade honors. He ruffed, drew two rounds of trumps, then led a club to the king. Now came a third diamond to dummy, and a second club.

East, Michael Cornell, took the ace and played a third club. Bramley won and paused to count up the hand. Since East clearly had both round aces to justify his cue-bid and had also shown up with the spade queen, he was less likely to have the heart jack than his partner — the point being that he might have opened the bidding with that hand, playing a weak no-trump that started at 11 high-card points. So Bart advanced the heart 10, and whether Lionel Wright covered that card or not, Bramley had his 10th trick.

In today's deal from the 1998 Cavendish Pairs tournament, Bob Hamman stretched to open the unappealing East hand one diamond. The combination of positive actions from East and West meant that when Nick Nickell tried three clubs at his third turn, Hamman did not care if this was intended as forcing, but passed gratefully.

Nickell took the opening heart lead in dummy and played a spade at trick two. East hopped up with the king and shifted a trump. Nickell could now win the club king and cross to the diamond ace to play the club ace. then the club jack, and drive out the club queen. Upon regaining the lead, he would play spades from the top. West could obtain the lead three times with his black winners and force declarer twice, once in either red suit,, but Nickell drew the last trump and then led top spades at every opportunity. At trick 13, West was left on lead with the spade six in his hand, and Nickell scored up his contract with the spade nine.

Unlikely as it may seem, East can beat three clubs by returning a spade at trick three. West wins the spade jack and leads a low spade to promote the club nine.

In these sorts of positions, one tends to do whatever declarer does not want you to do. Here the fact that declarer is playing the side-suit seems to mean that you should not do the same thing, but should play trumps, does it not?

On an unopposed sequence Gaylor Kasle declared six hearts as South. (It might be better not to ask why, but it involved North's missorting his hand). He received the spade queen lead, and he won the king and drew four rounds of trump,while East pitched a couple of diamonds and a couple of spades.

Now the simple analysis might be to assume that since West has four hearts and East none, West (who must hold the club king to give you a chance) is more likely to have the doubleton king than four clubs to the K-10.

However, Kasle saw there was no need to commit himself at once. He carefully found out more about the hand by playing ace and a second diamond toward the queen. East took his king and declarer saw the spade nine discarded on his left, after some thought.

Now the odds in clubs had changed dramatically. Since his LHO had started with five red cards and his RHO with six, the odds favored the double finesse in clubs rather than playing for the doubleton king onside — and that is what Kasle did, by running the club jack. When it was covered, he crossed back to hand to repeat the club finesse against the 10 to bring home the contract.

In this deal from the Cavendish pairs I thought Geoff Hampson made a nice play to disguise his intentions although the defense certainly missed a chance or two. Having opened a precision one diamond with the South cards, Hampson was driven to three no-trump after Brad Moss (West) had overcalled one spade. Eric Greco as North made a negative double, Hampson rebid one no-trump and Greco raised him to game. The one good thing about this auction was that Hampson had suggested more in spades than he had, so naturally Moss did not lead the suit he had bid, since he held just four spades.

On the lead of the heart nine Hampson took the king and played the club eight to the king and ace, and now Moss did not see the danger of the club suit, whereas if declarer had run the club eight or 10 from dummy at once, the position would have been obvious. When Moss pressed on with hearts, declarer could win dummy(s queen and run the club 10.

Moss ducked this trick, so Hampson played a diamond to his king and a third club. Moss won his queen and exited with another diamond, but when that suit split, declarer had nine tricks.

Curiously, Moss might still have beaten the contract in the ending had he shifted to a low spade after winning the club queen. Declarer had formed the impression that Moss had a broken five-card spade suit to one top honor, and would have ducked the spade — letting the defense run the spade suit.

In the Dutch bridge magazine IMP, Onno Eskes has investigated the limits of computers' abilities at bridge. He predicts that the next generation of bridge programs will beat world champions within the next five years. Here is the computer at work.

Against three diamonds doubled, West leads out the three top clubs and East follows suit with the two, eight, and jack (suggesting an original odd number). Can the hand still be made?

The problem is virtually an open book after West’s Flannery opening, the penalty double, and East’s signals. It may not seem possible that you can prevent East from taking three trump tricks, but for the computer, these types of problems are a cinch. It ruffs the third round of clubs, takes the heart finesse, and ruffs a spade in dummy. The heart ace is cashed and we have reduced to a five-card ending where dummy has three trumps, a club loser and a heart loser, South has three trumps with a spade and a heart loser, and East has all his five trumps.

When the last club is led from North, East must ruff high to prevent the diamond eight from becoming South’s ninth trick, allowing declarer to discard the heart eight. East is now forced to exit with a high diamond, taken by North’s ace. East is then forced to play yet another high trump on the lead of dummy’s heart, and now he is endplayed, having to lead away from his 9-7 of trumps; his third trump winner has vanished!